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Abstract—In this paper, an economic model is proposed for
joint time resource allocation and energy trading between two
service providers, i.e., IoT service provider (ISP) and energy
service provider (ESP), in a heterogeneous IoT wireless-powered
communication network. In particular, IoT devices (with various
communication types and energy constraints) are assumed to
belong the ISP who collects sensing data from IoT devices for
its services. Meanwhile, the ESP utilizes a power beacon to
provide energy services for the ISP. A Stackelberg game model
is formulated to jointly maximize the revenue of both the ISP
and ESP (i.e., network throughput and energy efficiency) through
investigating the energy interaction between them. Specially, the
ISP leads the game by requesting an optimal energy price and
service time that maximize its revenue to the ESP. Following
the requested deal from the ISP, the ESP supplies an opti-
mized transmission power which satisfies the energy demand of
the ISP while maximizes its utility. To obtain the Stackelberg
Equilibrium, we first derive a closed-form solution for the ESP.
Then two relaxed schemes (i.e., partial or joint energy price
and service time adjustments) based on block coordinate descent
(BCD) and convex-concave procedure (CCCP) techniques are
proposed to solve the non-convex optimization problem for the
ISP. Due to the selfish behavior of both players, we investigate
the inefficiency of the proposed approach by proposing two
baseline scenarios, i.e., non-negotiated energy trading and social
welfare scenarios, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA). Finally,
numerical results reveal that our approach can achieve significant
improvements in revenues of both providers compared with
conventional transmission methods, e.g., bistatic backscatter, and
harvest-then-transmit communication methods.
Index Terms—Stackelberg game, bistatic backscatter, low-
power communications, heterogeneous IoT networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging Internet of Things (IoT) is a smart network
which converges modern technologies to connect various smart
devices to the Internet and enables information sharing and
exchange among IoT devices [1]. Over the last decade, with
rapid development, IoT has been applied almost everywhere
such as smart city, home, agriculture, healthcare, and trans-
portation to facilitate our lives [1]-[2]. To meet low-cost and
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lightweight requirements, IoT devices are usually powered
by batteries with small capacities to support their operations.
However, frequent recharging/replacing batteries for a massive
number of such IoT devices is ineffective because it is costly,
inconvenient, and impractical in some cases (e.g., biomedical
implants) [3].
A promising technology, called Harvest-then-transmit
(HTT) [4]-[6], can be a possible solution for self-supplied IoT
networks. However, due to low efficiency in harvesting energy
from surrounding radio frequency (RF) signals and imperfect
battery storage, energy achieved in the harvesting phase is
typically low to sustain the RF communication phase on
IoT devices [7]. Recently, another capable solution developed
based on reflecting the incident RF signal is backscatter com-
munications. There are three types of backscatter communica-
tions listed in [8] are monostatic [9], bistatic [10], and ambient
backscatter communications [11]. Yet backscatter efficiencies
of these systems are not high enough to completely replace the
HTT technology. Hence, the aforementioned technologies, i.e.,
the HTT and backscatter communications, can be integrated
to complement to each other in a hybrid system, called a
wireless-powered backscatter communication (WPBC) net-
work [12]-[16].
In a WPBC network, a wireless-powered device (WPD),
e.g., an IoT device, is designed to perform either backscatter
communications (i.e., passive transmissions) or transmissions
using its RF circuit (i.e., active transmissions) and the energy
harvested from a power beacon (PB). In order to improve
the performance of the WPBC system, there is a need for a
mechanism to flexibly schedule energy harvesting, passive and
active transmission operations of IoT devices [13], [15], [17].
Most existing work on the WPBC optimize time allocation
for IoT devices’ operations under the TDM framework with
the assumption of homogeneous IoT devices [12]-[16]. The
experimental results show that the network throughput can be
significantly improved by using this method due to absolute
interference cancellation. In practice, however, various types
of IoT devices with different hardware capabilities and config-
urations, e.g., performing backscattering or HTT or both can
coexist. In such a circumstance, these devices must be taken
different energy and communications constraints into account.
Game theory-based time scheduling optimization in WPBC
networks has been investigated in the literature [15]-[16].
In [15], the authors propose a Stackelberg game to formulate
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2network throughput as the profit of the network, in which the
gateway is the leader and the IoT devices are the follower.
Simulation results reveal the impact of the competition on the
profit of players. The authors in [16] model a single-leader-
multiple-follower Stackelberg game which takes the interfer-
ence’s impact into account. The proposed scheme achieves a
higher throughput compared with fixed transmission modes.
However, a large number of IoT devices can belong to an
IoT service provider (ISP) who is required to pay for energy
to operate its service (e.g., a contractor that provides data
collecting/monitoring services for smart cities). In such a case,
the energy cost/negotiation between the ISP and an energy
service provider (ESP) should be taken into account while
optimizing the scheduling of IoT devices.
In this paper, our work aims to address the above by study-
ing the self-interest interaction between the ISP and ESP (via
the PB) and its implication on optimizing the energy trading
and time scheduling for a heterogeneous WPBC (HWPBC)
network. Specifically, we use the Stackelberg game to capture
the strategic interaction between the PB and the IoT devices.
Under such a game, the ISP that acts as the leader can
proactively select the best energy service from the ESP by
sending its energy request with a price and charging time (i.e.,
energy service time). The ESP modeled as the follower then
finds the optimal transmission power which can maximize its
benefits while meeting requirements from the ISP. A quadratic
price model for energy trading [18] is developed to optimize
the profit of the ESP, i.e., the follower, achieved by selling
energy based on the requested price and operation time of
the ISP, i.e., the leader. Thus, the optimal transmission power
of the PB is derived in a close-form. In addition, the profit
function of the ISP is the difference between the revenue
from providing services (i.e., collecting data) and the energy
cost. It is non-convex and contains multi-variables (i.e., the
requested price, and operation times of the PB and IoT
devices). To address the maximization problem of ISP’s profit,
we propose two relaxed schemes, called partial adjustment
(PA) and joint adjustment (JA) of energy price and service
time, that perform iterative algorithms based on the block
coordinate descent (BCD) technique [19]. In the PA scheme,
the iterative algorithm solves three sub-problems with respect
to the requested price, service time of the PB, and scheduling
times of the IoT devices, respectively in each its iteration.
Whilst, the JA scheme splits the primary problem into two sub-
problems, in which the former jointly optimize the requested
price and service time of the PB, and the latter allocates
the operation times for IoT devices optimally. Then, we
adopt the convex-concave procedure (CCCP) technique [20]
to address the joint sub-problem in the JA scheme. As a
result, our proposed schemes can guarantee to always achieve
the Stackelberg equilibrium in polynomial time. Furthermore,
two baseline scenarios, i.e., non-negotiated energy trading and
social welfare scenarios, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) [21]
ratio are proposed to evaluate the inefficiency of the proposed
approach due to the selfish behaviors of both players. For
performance comparison, we perform simulations to compare
the revenues of both providers achieved by the proposed
approach and other conventional transmission methods (i.e.,
bistatic backscatter communication mode (BBCM) [22] and
HTT communication mode (HTTCM) [4]). Numerical results
then verify that the proposed approach outperforms other
conventional transmission methods.
The major contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
1) We propose a heterogeneous WPBC network comprising
of two service providers, i.e., the ISP and ESP, in which
various IoT devices with diverse hardware configura-
tions and capabilities are considered to belong the ISP.
2) We propose an energy trading model based on Stackel-
berg game where the ISP is the leader and the ESP is
the follower. Two baseline scenarios, i.e., energy trading
without negotiation and social welfare scenarios are
presented to compare with the proposed energy trading
model. In addition, the inefficiency of the proposed
approach, due to selfish behaviors of both players,
determined by the PoA ratio is investigated through
numerical results.
3) Two schemes (i.e., the PA and JA schemes) performing
iterative algorithms based on the BCD and CCCP tech-
niques are proposed to maximize the revenue of the ISP
which originally is a multi-variable non-convex function.
Simulation results show the revenue comparison of the
ISP achieved by the proposed approach and other con-
ventional methods using both the PA and JA schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model. Section III formulates the Stack-
elberg game for joint energy trading and time scheduling, and
two iterative algorithms are provided in Section IV to find
the Stackelberg equilibrium. Section V conducts simulations
to validate the theoretical derivations. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Setting
As illustrated in Fig. 1(a), we consider the HWPBC consist-
ing of two service providers, i.e., the ISP and ESP. At the ISP,
we consider three types of low-cost IoT devices with dissimilar
hardware configurations that can support two functions: i.e.,
the BBCM and/or HTTCM. The first set of IoT devices
represented by A ∆= {AWPDa|∀a = {1, . . . , A}} is active
wireless-powered IoT devices (AWPDs) that are equipped with
energy harvesting and wireless transmission circuits. With this
configuration, the AWPDs can operate in the HTTCM only. In
addition, we denote P∆={PWPDp|∀p= {1, . . . , P}} to be the
set of passive wireless-powered IoT devices (PWPDs) that are
designed with a backscattering circuit to perform the BBCM
only. Finally, hybrid wireless-powered IoT devices (HWPDs)
belonging to the set H ∆= {HWPDh|∀h = {1, . . . ,H}} are
equipped with all hardware components to support both afore-
mentioned operation modes. On the other hand, the ESP
utilizes a dedicated power beacon (PB) to supply energy for
the IoT devices.
The IoT service is operated over two consecutive work-
ing periods of the PB, i.e., emitting period β and sleeping
period (1− β) as shown in Fig. 1(b). For simplicity and
3AWPD
Power Beacon
HWPD
PWPD
HWPD
RF signals
Energy Service IoT Service
IoT Gateway
Backscatter information
Transmit information
𝜃1 𝜏𝐻 𝜈1 𝜇𝐻
Sleeping period (1 − 𝛽)
Normalized time frame of the communication service
Emitting period 𝛽
𝜃𝑃 𝜈𝐴𝜏1 𝜇1
Backscatter
Actively Transmit 
Harvest Energy
Unlocated Unlocated
PWPDs HWPDs AWPDs HWPDs
A ∪ H\{HWPDH}A ∪ H\{HWPD1} A ∪ HA ∪ HA ∪ H
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: (a) System model (b) Time frame of the communication service in the HWPBC network.
efficiency in time resource allocation for multiple IoT devices,
the TDMA mechanism is adopted here to avoid collisions
among transmissions. We denote θ ∆= (θ1, . . . , θp, . . . , θP)
T
and τ ∆= (τ1, . . . , τh, . . . , τH)
T as the backscattering time
vectors for the PWPDs and HWPDs in the emitting period
of the PB, respectively. Similarly, ν ∆= (ν1, . . . , νa, . . . , νA)
T
and µ ∆= (µ1, . . . , µh, . . . , µH)
T are the transmission time
vectors for AWPDs and HWPDs in the idle period of the
PB, respectively. When the PB is in the emitting period, it
transmits unmodulated RF signals, and thus the IoT devices
(i.e., PWPDs and HWPDs) with the capability of backscat-
tering can passively transmit their data by leveraging such
signals. Meanwhile, the AWPDs and HWPDs equipped with
energy harvesting circuits can harvest energy for their active
transmissions in the sleeping period of the PB. Note that, an
AWPDa can execute energy harvesting in the entire emitting
period (i.e., β), while the harvesting time of an HWPDh is
(β − τh) because it must backscatter in the time slot τh.
In the sleeping period of the PB, the AWPDs and HWPDs
can perform active transmissions to deliver their data to the
gateway based on the TDMA protocol.
B. Network Throughput Analysis
The network throughput (denoted by Rsum) of communi-
cations between the IoT devices and gateway is defined as the
total information bits decoded successfully at the gateway over
the two periods of the PB.
1) Emitting period of the PB: In this period, the IoT devices
(i.e., PWPDs and HWPDs) will perform backscattering the
RF signal from the PB to deliver their information. We
assume that the PWPDs and HWPDs implement backscatter
frequency-shift keying (FSK), or binary FSK to gain more 3
dB than the classic FSK [10]-[22]. The power beacon transmits
a continuous sinusoid wave of the frequency Fc with the
complex baseband equivalent as follows:
c (t) =
√
2PSe
−j(2pi∆Ft+∆$), (1)
where the PS is the transmission power of the PB, ∆F and
∆$ are the frequency and phase offsets, respectively, between
the PB and the IoT gateway.
We assume communication channels of three types of links:
(1) the links from the PB to the IoT devices, (2) the links from
the IoT devices to the IoT gateway, (3) the link from the PB
to the IoT gateway, suffer frequency non-selective fading (flat
fading) due to the low bit rate of backscatter communications.
Since the limited communication range, we consider light-of-
sight (LOS) environments in this paper, thus the channel gain
for the three types of links is given by:
gBD=
GBGDλ
2
(4pidBD)
2 , gDG=
GDGGλ
2
(4pidDG)
2 , gBG=
GBGGλ
2
(4pidBG)
2 , (2)
where GB , GD, GG denote the antenna gains of the PB, IoT
devices and IoT gateway, respectively. λ is the wavelength
of the RF signal, and dBD, dDG, and dBG are the commu-
nication distances of three aforementioned links. IoT devices
are irradiated by the RF undemodulated signal c(t). Then, the
baseband scatter waveform at the IoT devices are written as:
x (t) = γui (t)
√
gBD c(t), i ∈ {0, 1} , (3)
where η is the attenuation constant of the reflected waveform
depending on the backscattering efficiency. For the binary
FSK modulation, we consider two distinct load values Γi with
different rates Fi to represent bits bi ∈ {0, 1}, thus the base-
band backscatter FSK waveform ui(t) models the fundamental
frequency component of a 50% duty cycle square waveform
of frequency Fi and random initial phase Φi ∈ [0, 2pi):
ui (t) = u0 +
Γ0 − Γ1
2
4
pi
cos (2piFit+ Φi) , i ∈ {0, 1} (4)
where u0 =
(
As − Γ0+Γ12
)
, and As is a complex-valued term
related to the antenna structural mode [26].
The IoT gateway receives both the RF unmodulated signal
directly from the PB and the backscattered signals from the
IoT devices. Thus, the received baseband signal at the IoT
gateway for duration T of a single bit bi ∈ {0, 1} is given by:
y (t)=
√
gBG c(t) +
√
gDG x(t) + n(t)
=
√
2PS
{√
gBG+γ
√
gBD
√
gDGu0
+γ
√
gBD
√
gDG
2
pi
(Γ0−Γ1)cos(2piFit+Φi)
}
+n(t),
(5)
where n(t) is the channel noise. Carrier frequency offset
(CFO) and removing the DC value from the received signal
y(t) are carried out before the maximum-likelihood estimation
(MLE) is implemented at the IoT gateway. The received signal
y(t) is then rewritten as follows:
y(t)=γ
√
2PS
√
gBD
√
gDG
2
pi
(Γ0−Γ1)cos(2piFit+ Φi) (6)
4Thus, the received power at the IoT gateway is calculated as
follows:
P bbR = η
2gBDgDG
4
pi2
(Γ0 − Γ1)2PS (7)
The achievable rate of backscatter communications is given
by:
W = ΩB log2
(
1 +
ζP bbR
N0
)
(8)
where ΩB is the bandwidth of the unmodulated RF signal,
ζ is the performance gap reflecting real modulation, and N0
is the power spectral density (psd) of the channel noise. We
denote Wp and Wh are the achievable rates of the PWPDp
and HWPDh calculated as in (8), respectively. Finally, the
total throughput obtained by the AWPDs and HWPDs in the
emitting period of the PB is determined as follows:
Rbb=
P∑
p=1
Wpθp +
H∑
h=1
Whτh
=
P∑
p=1
ΩBθplog2(1+κpPS)+
H∑
h=1
ΩBτhlog2(1+κhPS)
(9)
where κp = ζη2pgBD,pgDG,p(Γ0 − Γ1)2 4pi2N0a and κh =
ζη2hgBD,hgDG,h(Γ0 − Γ1)2 4pi2N0h .
2) Sleeping period of the PB: As mentioned in the previous
subsection, only AWPDs and HWPDs are able to communicate
with the gateway in this period by using their RF transmission
circuits. The amount of harvested energy of the AWPDa and
HWPDh from the PB are calculated as follows:{
Ea = βP
B
R,a,
Eh = (β − τh)PBR,h,
(10)
where PBR,a = ϕagBD,aPS and P
B
R,h = ϕhgBD, hPS are
the received power at the AWPDa and HWPDh from the
PB, respectively [23]. PS is the transmission power of the
energy transmitter (i.e., the PB), and {ϕa, ϕh} are the har-
vesting efficiency coefficients of the AWPDa and HWPDh,
respectively. We consider the energy consumption by active
transmissions of the AWPDs and HWPDs as the dominant
energy consumption and ignore the energy consumed by
electronic circuits. Hence, all harvested energy of the AWPDs
and HWPDs is utilized to transmit data in the sleeping period
of the PB, and the transmission power of the AWPDa and
HWPDh are P ta=Ea/νa and P
t
h=Eh/µh, respectively. Then
the total throughput Rst achieved by active transmissions of
the AWPDs and HWPDs in the sleeping period of the PB are
determined by:
Rst=
A∑
a=1
νaΩDlog2
(
1+
ζgDG,aP
t
a
N0a
)
+
H∑
h=1
µhΩDlog2
(
1+
ζgDG,hP
t
h
N0h
)
=
A∑
a=1
νaΩDlog2
(
1+δa
βPS
νa
)
+
H∑
h=1
µhΩDlog2
[
1+δh
(β−τh)PS
µh
]
,
(11)
where δa =
ζϕagDG,agBD,a
Na0
and δh =
ζϕhgDG,hgBD,h
Nh0
. ΩD is
the bandwidth for the HTT protocol, and {N0a , N0h} are the
noise of the communication channels from the AWPDa and
HWPDh to the gateway, respectively.
Finally, the network throughput (Rsum) of the IoT service
can be determined as follows:
Rsum(θ,ν, τ ,µ) = R
bb+Rst
=
P∑
p=1
ΩBθplog2(1+κpPS)+
A∑
a=1
νaΩDlog2
(
1+δa
βPS
νa
)
+
H∑
h=1
{
ΩBτhlog2(1+κhPS)+µhΩDlog2
[
1+δh
(β−τh)PS
µh
]}
.
(12)
It is modeled as the achieved profit of the communication ser-
vice to jointly maximize the benefits of both service providers
in the HWPBC network.
III. JOINT ENERGY TRADING AND TIME ALLOCATION
BASED ON STACKELBERG GAME
Based on the system model given in the Section II, we
first introduce the Stackelberg game to model the energy
interaction between the ISP and ESP. Then we will present the
strategic behaviors of these service providers in the following
subsections.
A. Stackelberg Game-based Energy Trading
1) Game Formulation:
• Leader payoff function: The achievable benefit of the
ISP is defined as follows:
UL(pl, β,ψ) = prRsum − plβPS , (13)
where pr is the benefit per bit transmitted by IoT devices,
and pl is the energy price paid by the IoT service provider
to the energy service provider. The leader maximizes its
utility function UL w.r.t. the energy price pl, operation
time β, and time scheduling ψ ∆= (θ,ν, τ ,µ).
• Follower utility function: In this game, the PB is the
follower and it optimizes its transmission power based on
the requested energy price and operation time from the
IoT service provider. The utility function of the follower
is determined based on its profit obtained from the IoT
service provider and its cost incurred during the operation
time:
UF (PS) = β [plPS − F (PS)] , (14)
where F (x) = amx2 +bmx is a quadratic function which
is applied for the operation cost of the PB [18].
2) Solution to the Stackelberg Game: The definition of the
Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is stated as follows:
Definition 1. The optimal solution (P ∗S , p∗l , β∗,ψ∗) is the
Stackelberg equilibrium if the following conditions are sat-
isfied [24]:{
UL(P
∗
S , p
∗
l , β
∗,ψ∗) ≥ UL(P ∗S , pl, β,ψ) ,
UF (P
∗
S , p
∗
l , β
∗,ψ∗) ≥ UF (PS , p∗l , β∗,ψ∗) .
(15)
To obtain the Stackelberg game solution, we adopt the
backward induction technique in the two following theorems.
Theorem 1. Given a strategy of the leader (i.e., the ISP), the
follower (i.e., the PB) can obtain a unique optimal P ∗S in a
closed-form.
5Proof: Intuitively, given a strategy (pl, β,ψ) offered by
the leader, the utility function of the follower in (14) is a
quadratic function w.r.t. PS . Thus, the unique optimal solution
of PS can be obtained as follows:
P ∗S =
pl − bm
2am
. (16)
Theorem 2. Given the follower’s (i.e., the ESP) strategy P ∗S ,
there exits a sub-optimal solution for the leader (i.e., the ISP),
and the best strategy of the ISP can be obtained by an iterative
algorithm.
Proof: Given optimal transmission power P ∗S of the
follower, the leader payoff function can be rewritten as in (17).
Then, the maximum profit of the leader is expressed by the
strategic vector χ∗ = (p∗l , β
∗,ψ∗):
max
(pl,β,ψ)
UL(pl, β,ψ) , (18)
s.t. 0 ≤ PS ≤ PmaxS , (18a)
Pmini ≤ P ti ≤ Pmaxi , i ∈ {a, h} , (18b)
Emini ≤ Ei ≤ Emaxi , i ∈ {a, h} , (18c)
γbbi ≥ γmini , i ∈ {p, h} , (18d)
0 ≤
∑P
p=1
θp+
∑H
h=1
τh ≤ β ≤ 1,∀θp,∀τh≥0 (18e)
0≤
∑A
a=1
νa+
∑H
h=1
µh≤1−β≤1,∀νa,∀µh≥0, (18f)
It should be noted that the transmission power of the PB, i.e.,
PS =
(pl−bm)
2am
, must satisfy the FCC Rules [27] for unlicensed
wireless equipment operating in the ISM bands as shown in the
constraint (18a). For the IoT devices, the transmission power
of AWPDs and HWPDs, i.e., P ta =
ϕagBD,aβ(pl−bm)
2amνa
, and
P th =
ϕhgBD,h(β−τh)(pl−bm)
2amµh
, respectively, must be enough
for active communication with the IoT gateway as well as
under a threshold as presented in (18b). Next, the total
energy harvested by the AWPDs and HWPDs in the emit-
ting period of the PB, i.e., Ea =
ϕagBD,aβ(pl−bm)
2am
, Eh =
ϕhgBD,h(β−τh)(pl−bm)
2am
, must be sufficient for their operations,
as well as not exceed the capacity of their batteries as
represented in the constraints (18c). Furthermore, the SNR at
the gateway received from PWPDs and HWPDs by backscatter
communications, i.e., γbbp =
κp(pl−bm)
2am
, γbbh =
κh(pl−bm)
2am
,
must satisfy the constraints (18d) to guarantee bit-error-rate
(BER) lower than or equal to 10−2 for IoT applications
[ref???]. Finally, the constraints (18e)-(18f) are time con-
straints to impose IoT devices working on the proper periods,
i.e., the PWPDs and HWPDs must backscatter RF signals in
the emitting period and the AWPDs and HWPDs must perform
active transmissions in the idle period of the PB.
To find the optimal solution χ∗ = (p∗l , β
∗,ψ∗), in the next
section we introduce a low-complexity iterative algorithm us-
ing block coordinate descent (BCD) technique [19] to address
the non-convex optimization problem in (18).
B. Non-Negotiated Energy Trading
For comparison, we present a baseline scenario in which the
ESP sends a fixed energy price to the ISP without negotiation.
Then, the ISP optimizes its profit by adjusting the transmis-
sion power and buying time demand and data transmission
strategies (i.e., backscattering or active transmission). Given
energy price pl from the ESP, the achievable profit of the ISP
is expressed as follows:
UP (PS , β, ψ) = UT (PS , β, ψ)− plβPS , (19)
where UT (PS , β, ψ) presented in (20) is the total profit of
the ISP achieved by providing data service. Then, the profit
maximization of the IoT service is obtained as follows:
max
(PS ,β,ψ)
UP (PS , β,ψ) , (21)
s.t. satisfy constraints (18a)− (18f), (21a)
It is worth noting that, in this case, the profit function of the
ISP with respect to the transmission power and operation time
of the PB, and the scheduling time of IoT devices can also be
solved by the proposed schemes in the following section.
C. Social welfare scenario
Energy trading based on Stackelberg game formulated in
section III-A captures the strategic interaction between the
ISP and ESP. However, this trading strategy may lead to
the performance loss of both the ISP and ESP due to the
possible selfish behaviors of both players. Therefore, we
propose a social welfare scenario in which the ISP and ESP
cooperatively maximize the sum of their profits to investigate
the inefficiency of the proposed approach. Mathematically, the
utility function of social welfare can be formulated as below:
USW (PS , β,ψ) = UT (PS , β, ψ)−β
(
amP
2
S+bmPS
)
. (22)
Thus, the social welfare maximization problem is given by:
max
(PS ,β,ψ)
USW (PS , β,ψ) , (23)
s.t. satisfy constraints (18a)− (18f), (23a)
Similarly, the social welfare maximization problem can be
also solved efficiently by the relaxed schemes proposed in the
following section. To evaluate the inefficiency of the proposed
approach, we uses the Price of Anarchy (PoA) [21] which is
defined as the ratio of the utility value (i.e., defined in (22)) of
a worst Nash equilibrium and its maximum value. Note that,
in our game, the Stackelberg equilibrium is considered as the
worst Nash equilibrium. Then, the PoA ratio is expressed as
below:
PoA =
USW (χ
∗)
max
(PS ,β,ψ)
USW (PS , β,ψ)
(24)
IV. ITERATIVE ALGORITHMS TO FIND THE STACKELBERG
EQUILIBRIUM
To address the non-convex multi-variable optimization prob-
lem (18), we propose two relaxed schemes, i.e., partial adjust-
ment (PA) and joint adjustment (JA) of the energy price and
service time of the PB, which exploit the BCD technique.
These schemes reduce significantly number of variables in
the original optimization problem by splitting it into convex
optimization sub-problems and solving them in each iteration.
6UL(pl, β,ψ) = pr
{
P∑
p=1
ΩBθplog2
(
1+κp
(pl − bm)
2am
)
+
A∑
a=1
ΩDνalog2
[
1+δa
β (pl − bm)
2νaam
]
+
H∑
h=1
[
ΩBτhlog2
(
1+κh
(pl−bm)
2am
)
+ΩDµhlog2
(
1+δh
(β−τh)(pl−bm)
2µham
)]}
− plβ(pl−bm)
2am
.
(17)
UT (PS, β,ψ)=pr
{
P∑
p=1
ΩBθplog2(1+κpPS)+
A∑
a=1
ΩDνalog2
(
1+δa
βPS
νa
)
+
H∑
h=1
[
ΩBτhlog2(1+κhPS)+ΩDµhlog2
(
1+δh
(β−τh)PS
µh
)]}
.
(20)
Thus, the proposed schemes expected to be a powerful tool
to address the original problem efficiently are presented in the
following subsections.
A. PA Scheme
This scheme performs an iterative algorithm to divide the
variable tuple χ into 3 different blocks of variables, i.e., the
energy price pl, the emitting time β, and the scheduling times
ψ
∆
= (θ, τ ,ν,µ). In particular, the algorithm starts by ini-
tializing an initial solution {pl(0), β(0),ψ(0)}. The following
three steps are repeated until no further improvement can
be obtained: (i) optimize the energy price pl(n) from the
last optimal output {p(n−1)l , β(n−1),ψ(n−1)}; (ii) obtain the
emitting time of the PB β(n) by keeping the {pl(n),ψ(n−1)}
fixed; (iii) find the optimal scheduling times ψ(n) of the IoT
devices with the fixed pl(n) and β(n). These steps are described
in detail as the follows:
1) Optimal Energy Price Offered for the PB: In the first
step of the algorithm loop, we obtain the optimal requested
price pl based on the optimal solution from the previous
step {p(n−1)l , β(n−1),ψ(n−1)}. It is worth noting that the time
constraints in the problem (18) are eliminated because the time
variables are constant and set by the previous optimal vector
ψ(n−1). Then, the original optimization problem (18) can be
transformed into:
max
pl
G(pl), (25)
s.t. 0 ≤ pl − bm ≤ 2amPmaxS , (25a)
Pmina ≤ ra,1 (pl − bm) ≤ Pmaxa , (25b)
Pminh ≤ rh,2 (pl − bm) ≤ Pmaxh , (25c)
Emina ≤ ra,1ν(n−1)a (pl − bm) ≤ Emaxa , (25d)
Eminh ≤ rh,2µ(n−1)h (pl − bm) ≤ Emaxh , (25e)
cp,2 (pl − bm) ≥ γminp , (25f)
ch,6 (pl − bm) ≥ γminh , (25g)
where and cp,1 =prΩBθ
(n−1)
p , cp,2 =
κp
2am
, ca,3 =prΩDν
(n−1)
a ,
ca,4 =
δaβ
(n−1)
2ν
(n−1)
a am
, ch,5 = prΩBτh, ch,6 = κh2am , ch,7 =
prΩDµ
(n−1)
h , ch,8 =
δh
(
β(n−1)−τ(n−1)h
)
2µ
(n−1)
h am
, ra,1 =
ca,4N
a
0
ζgDG,a
, rh,2 =
ch,8N
h
0
ζgDG,h
, (∀a ∈ A,∀h ∈ H).
Lemma 1. The objective function G is a concave function
w.r.t. pl satisfying the linear constraints in (25a)-(25d), and
the optimal solution for the single variable sub-problem (25)
can be obtained by line search methods.
Proof: The function G(pl) is a sum of logarithmic
functions of pl which has the form log2(atx + bt), and a
quadratic function f(pl) = −c9pl(pl − bm). Intuitively, the
logarithmic function log2(atx + bt) is a concave function
w.r.t. x. On the other hand, the quadratic function f(pl) is
also a concave function. Thus, the objective function G is
a concave function w.r.t. pl. Since the sub-problem (25) is
a single variable optimization problem which can be solved
efficiently using the line search methods such as the golden
section or parabolic interpolation methods.
2) Optimal Emitting Time of the PB: Similar to the sub-
problem (25), the transmission power constraint of the PB,
the time constraints of all IoT devices, and SNR constraints
of backscatter devices are always satisfied with the fixed
{p(n)l ,ψ(n−1)}, thus they are totally ignored. The optimal
emitting time β of the PB in the n-th iteration can be obtained
in the second step by solving the following sub-problem:
max
β
Gˆ (β) , (27)
s.t. 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, (27a)
Pmina ≤ rˆa,1β ≤ Pmaxa , (27b)
Pminh ≤ rˆh,2(β − cˆh,5) ≤ Pmaxh , (27c)
Emina ≤ rˆa,1ν(n−1)a β ≤ Emaxa , (27d)
Eminh ≤ rˆh,2µ(n−1)h (β − cˆh,5) ≤ Emaxh , (27e)
where
Gˆ(β)=
A∑
a=1
cˆa,1log2[1+cˆa,2β]+
H∑
h=1
cˆh,3log2[1+cˆh,4(β−cˆh,5)]
−cˆ6β+Cˆ,
(28)
Cˆ=pr
P∑
p=1
Ωθ(n−1)p log2
1+κp
(
p
(n−1)
l −bm
)
2am

+ pr
H∑
h=1
Ωτ
(n−1)
h log2
1+κh
(
p
(n−1)
l − bm
)
2am
,
(29)
7G (pl) =
P∑
p=1
cp,1log2 [1 + cp,2(pl − bm)] +
A∑
a=1
ca,3log2 [1 + ca,4(pl − bm)]
+
H∑
h=1
{ch,5log2 [1 + ch,6(pl − bm)] + ch,7log2 [1 + ch,8(pl − bm)]} −
β(n−1)pl (pl − bm)
2am
,
(26)
cˆa,1 = prΩDν
(n−1)
a , cˆa,2 =
δa
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2ν
(n−1)
a am
, cˆh,3 = prΩDµ
(n−1)
h ,
cˆh,4 =
δh
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2µ
(n−1)
h am
, cˆh,5 = τ
(n−1)
h , cˆ6 =
p
(n)
l
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2am
, rˆa,1 =
cˆa,2N
a
0
ζgDG,a
, rˆh,2 =
cˆh,4N
h
0
ζgDG,h
, (∀a ∈ A,∀h ∈ H).
Lemma 2. The objective function Gˆ is a concave function
w.r.t. β satisfying the linear constraints in (27a)-(27c), and
the optimal solution for the single variable sub-problem (27)
can be obtained by line search methods.
Proof: Following the proof of the Lemma 1, the function
Gˆ(β) is contributed by logarithmic functions forming as
log2 (atx+ bt) and a linear function fˆ(β) = −cˆ6β. The
logarithmic function log2 (atx+ bt) is also concave w.r.t. x.
Moreover, Cˆ is constant with the fixed ψ(n−1). Thus, the
objective function Gˆ is concave w.r.t. β. Therefore, the optimal
solution of the single variable sub-problem (27) can be also
found efficiently by line search methods.
3) Optimal Time Resource Allocation: In the third step,
we investigate the time scheduling ψ(n) based on the given
{p(n)l , β(n)}. The original optimization problem (18) is sim-
plified into:
max
ψ
G˜ (ψ) , (30)
s.t. Pmina ≤
r˜a,1
νa
≤ Pmaxa , (30a)
Pminh ≤
r˜h,2 (c˜h,4 − r˜h,5τh)
µh
≤ Pmaxh , (30b)
Eminh ≤ r˜h,2 (c˜h,4 − c˜h,5τh) ≤ Emaxh , (30c)
0≤
∑P
p=1
θp+
∑H
h=1
τh≤1− β(n),∀θp, τh≥0, (30d)
0 ≤
∑A
a=1
νa +
∑H
h=1
µh ≤ β(n),∀νa, µh≥0, (30e)
where
G˜(ψ)=
P∑
p=1
c˜p,1θp+
A∑
a=1
prΩDνalog2
(
1+
c˜a,2
νa
)
+
H∑
h=1
[˜
ch,3τh+prΩDµhlog2
(
1+
c˜h,4−c˜h,5τh
µh
)]
+C˜,
(31)
C˜ = −p
(n)
l β
(n)
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2am
, c˜p,1 =
prΩB log2
[
1 + κp
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2am
]
, c˜a,2 =
δaβ
(n)
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2am
,
c˜h,3 =prΩB log2
[
1 + κh
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2am
]
, c˜h,4 =
δhβ
(n)
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2am
,
c˜h,5 =
δh
(
p
(n)
l −bm
)
2am
, r˜a,1 =
c˜3,aN
a
0
ζgDG,a
, r˜h,2 =
Nh0
ζgDG,h
,
(∀a ∈ A,∀h ∈ H). It is obvious that the SNR constraints of
backscatter devices, i.e., PWPDs and HWPDs, as well as the
energy constraints for AWPDs and HWPDs are removed as
they always be satisfied with the fixed {p(n)l , β(n)}.
To obtain the optimal solution for the sub-problem (30), we
have the following Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. The objective function G3 is a concave function
w.r.t. ψ satisfying the linear constraints in (30a)-(30d), and
the optimal solution for the multi-variable sub-problem (30)
can be obtained by the interior-point method.
Proof: See Appendix A.
4) The overall iterative algorithm for scheme I: Finally,
the proposed iterative algorithm is summarized in the Al-
gorithm 1. The convergence and computing complexity of
the proposed iterative algorithm is provided in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. For the PA scheme, the Algorithm 1 is guaranteed
to converge to the SE point, and it converges in polynomial
time.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Algorithm 1 The iterative algorithm for the PA scheme to
solve the non-convex multi-variable optimization problem in
(18).
1: Input: The previous output {pl(n−1), β(n−1),ψ(n−1)}.
2: Initialize: n = 1, {pl(0), β(0),ψ(0)}, tolerance ξ1 > 0.
3: Compute: the leader’s utility UL
(
pl
(0), β(0),ψ(0)
)
.
4: Repeat:
5: Optain pl(n) for given {pl(n−1), β(n−1),ψ(n−1)} by
solving (25);
6: Derive the optimal value β(n) with fixed
{pl(n),ψ(n−1)} by solving (27);
7: For given {pl(n), β(n)},ψ(n) is obtained by solving (30);
8: If:
9:
∣∣UL(pl(n), β(n),ψ(n))−UL(pl(n−1), β(n−1),ψ(n−1))∣∣<ξ1;
10: Then:
11: Set {pl∗, β∗,ψ∗}={pl(n), β(n),ψ(n)}; and terminate;
12: Otherwise:
13: Update n← n+ 1, and continue.
14: Output: The optimal solution χ∗ = {pl∗, β∗,ψ∗}.
B. JA Scheme
Different to the PA scheme, we first perform a joint opti-
mization of the energy price and service time for the PB due
to their trade-off relation. After that, time scheduling for the
IoT devices are obtained with the optimal value of {pl, β} in
the current loop by solving the problem (30).
81) Joint optimal energy price and service time: With given
tuple {pl(n−1), β(n−1),ψ(n−1)} from the previous output, we
find the joint optimal energy price and service time by solving
the following sub-problem:
max
pl,β
Q (pl, β) , (32)
s.t. 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, (32a)
0 ≤ pl − bm ≤ 2amPmaxS , (32b)
Pmina ≤ sa,1β(pl − bm) ≤ Pmaxa , (32c)
Pminh ≤ sh,2
(
β − τ (n−1)h
)
(pl − bm) ≤ Pmaxh , (32d)
Emina ≤ sa,1ν(n−1)a β(pl−bm)≤ Emaxa , (32e)
Eminh ≤ sh,2µ(n−1)h
(
β−τ (n−1)h
)
(pl−bm)≤ Emaxh , (32f)
ep,2 (pl − bm) ≥ γminp , eh,6 (pl − bm) ≥ γminh , (32g)
where Q (pl, β) is expressed in (33), and ep,1 = prΩBθ
(n−1)
p ,
ep,2 =
κp
2am
, ea,3 = prΩDν
(n−1)
a , ea,4 = δa
2ν
(n−1)
a am
, eh,5 =
prΩBτ
(n−1)
h , eh,6 =
κh
2am
, eh,7 =prΩDµ
(n−1)
h , eh,8 =
δh
2amµ
(n−1)
h
,
sa,1 =
ea,4N
a
0
ζgDG,a
, sh,2 =
eh,8N
h
0
ζgDG,h
, (∀a ∈ A,∀h ∈ H).
However, the sub-problem (32) is non-convex due to the
product of βpl (pl − bm). To address this problem, we lin-
earise this product by defining q1 = 12 (pl − bm)(1 + β),
q2 =
1
2 (pl − bm) (1− β), then the problem (32) becomes:
max
q1,q2
Qˆ (q1, q2) , (34)
s.t.0 ≤ q2 ≤ q1, (34a)
0 ≤ q1 + q2 ≤ 2amPmaxS , (34b)
q1 − q2
q1 + q2
≥ T (n−1)bs ,
2q2
q1 + q2
≥ T (n−1)at , (34c)
Pmina ≤sa,1(q1−q2)≤Pmaxa , (34d)
Pminh ≤sh,2
[(
1−τ (n−1)h
)
q1−
(
1+τ
(n−1)
h
)
q2
]
≤Pmaxh , (34e)
Emina ≤sa,1ν(n−1)a (q1−q2)≤Emaxa , (34f)
Eminh ≤sh,2µ(n−1)h
[(
1−τ (n−1)h
)
q1−
(
1+τ
(n−1)
h
)
q2
]
≤Emaxh ,
(34g)
ep,2 (q1 + q2) ≥ γminp , eh,6 (q1 + q2) ≥ γminh , (34h)
where Qˆ(q1, q2) is expressed in (35), and T
(n−1)
bs =∑P
p=1 θ
(n−1)
p +
∑H
h=1 τ
(n−1)
h , T
(n−1)
at =
∑A
a=1 ν
(n−1)
a +∑H
h=1 µ
(n−1)
h . Intuitively, the last term of the objective func-
tion Lˆ(q1, q2) is convex, while other terms are concave. We
define V ∆= {q1, q2} and S is the set of V satisfying (34a)-
(34f), then the objective function of the problem (34) is
rewritten as follows:
Qˆ (V ) = Qccav (V ) +Qcvex (V ) , (36)
where
Qcvex =
(
q22 + bmq2
)
2am
. (38)
The problem (34) is the difference-of-convex-function (DC)
programming problem, which can be solved efficiently by the
convex-concave procedure (CCCP) [20]. The core idea of the
CCCP is to linearise the last term (i.e., convex function) by
the first-order Taylor expansion at the current fixed point. We
denote V (k−1) ∆=
{
q
(k−1)
1 , q
(k−1)
2
}
as the fixed point at the l-th
iteration, then the problem (34) can be solved by the following
sequential convex programming with linear constraints (34a)-
(34e):
V (k) = arg max
V ∈S
Q˜ (V )
= arg max
V ∈S
{
Qccav(V ) + V
T∇Qcvex
(
V (k−1)
)}
,
(39)
where ∇Qcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
=
(2q
(k−1)
2 +bm)
2am
is the gradient of
Qcvex (V ) at V (k−1). Ultimately, Q˜(V ) is a convex function,
thus V (k) can be efficiently obtained by numerical methods,
such as Newton or Interior-point methods.
In general, the CCCP can start by any point within
the feasible region defined by the constraints (34a)-
(34e). However, we choose the initial value V (0) ={
q
(0)
1
(
p
(n−1)
l , β
(n−1)
)
, q
(0)
2
(
p
(n−1)
l , β
(n−1)
)}
to guarantee the con-
vergence of the proposed iterative method. The entire proce-
dure of the CCCP algorithm is summarized in the Algorithm 2.
For analysis of the convergency of the CCCP algorithm, we
Algorithm 2 The CCCP algorithm to solve the DC program-
ming problem in (39).
1: Input: The previous result of the BCD algorithm
{p(n−1)l , β(n−1),ψ(n−1)}.
2: Initialize: Initiate k=1, a tolerance ξ2>0, and a feasible
solution V (0)={q(0)1 (p(n−1)l , β(n−1)), q(0)2 (p(n−1)l , β(n−1))}.
3: Repeat:
4: Transform the problem (34) into the problem (39);
5: Obtain the optimal V (k−1) by solving the problem (39);
6: If:
7:
∣∣∣Qˆ (V (k))− Qˆ (V (k−1))∣∣∣ < ξ2;
8: Then:
9: Set V ∗ = V (k); and terminate;
10: Otherwise:
11: Update k ← k + 1, and continue.
12: Output: The optimal solution V ∗ = {q1∗, q2∗}.
state the following theorem and then prove it in Appendix C.
Theorem 4. The Algorithm 2 utilizing the CCCP technique
to solve the joint optimization problem (39). It converges to a
local optimum V ∗ by generating a sequence of V (k) providing
Qˆ
(
V (k)
)
> Qˆ
(
V (k−1)
)
,∀k ≥ 1.
2) The overall iterative algorithm for the JA scheme: After
the implementation of the joint energy price and service time
estimation, we perform time allocation for the IoT devices op-
timally by solving the problem (30). These steps are repeated
until the stopping criterion of the algorithm is satisfied. The
overall iterative algorithm for the JA scheme is summarized in
the Algorithm 3. Its convergence is analyzed in the following
theorem, which can be proved similarly as the Theorem 3.
9Q (pl, β) =
P∑
p=1
ep,1log2 [1 + ep,2 (pl − bm)] +
A∑
a=1
ea,3log2 [1 + ea,4β (pl − bm)]
+
H∑
h=1
{
eh,5log2 [1 + eh,6 (pl − bm)] + eh,7log2
[
1 + eh,8(β − τ (n−1)h ) (pl − bm)
]}
− βpl (pl − bm)
2am
,
(33)
Qˆ(q1, q2)=
P∑
p=1
ep,1log2 [1 + ep,2 (q1 + q2)] +
A∑
a=1
ea,3log2 [1 + ea,4 (q1 − q2)]
+
H∑
h=1
{
eh,5log2[1+eh,6(q1+q2)]+eh,7log2
[
1+eh,8(1−τ (n−1)h )q1−eh,8(1+τ (n−1)h )q2
]}
−
(
q21 +bmq1
)
2am
+
(
q22 +bmq2
)
2am
,
(35)
Qccav(V) =
P∑
p=1
ep,1log2[1+ep,2(q1+q2)]+
A∑
a=1
ea,3log2[1+ea,4(q1−q2)]
+
H∑
h=1
{
eh,5log2[1+eh,6(q1+q2)]+eh,7log2
[
1+eh,8(1−τ (n−1)h )q1−eh,8(1+τ (n−1)h )q2
]}
−
(
q21 +bmq1
)
2am
,
(37)
Algorithm 3 The proposed iterative algorithm for the JA
scheme
1: Input: The previous output {pl(n−1), β(n−1),ψ(n−1)}.
2: Initialize: n = 1, {pl(0), β(0),ψ(0)}, tolerance ξ1 > 0.
3: Compute: the leader’s utility UL
(
pl
(0), β(0),ψ(0)
)
.
4: Repeat:
5: Obtain the joint optimal {pl(n), β(n)} from the previous
output {pl(n−1), β(n−1),ψ(n−1)} by processing the CCCP
algorithm to solve the problem (39);
6: Derive the optimal ψ(n)with fixed {pl(n),β(n)} by solving
the problem (27);
7: If:
8:
∣∣UL(pl(n), β(n),ψ(n))−UL(pl(n−1), β(n−1),ψ(n−1))∣∣<ξ1;
9: Then:
10: Set {pl∗, β∗,ψ∗} = {pl(n), β(n),ψ(n)}; and terminate;
11: Otherwise:
12: Update n← n+ 1, and continue.
13: Output: The optimal solution χ∗ = {pl∗, β∗,ψ∗}.
Theorem 5. For the JA scheme, the proposed iterative Al-
gorithm 3 converges to the SE point, and it converges in
polynomial time.
Proof: Similar to the proof of the Theorem 3.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first investigate the inefficiency of the
proposed approach, and then verify revenues of both providers
in comparison with conventional transmission modes. We
consider the carrier frequency of RF signals at 2.4 GHz. The
bandwidth of the RF signals and the antenna gain of the PB are
10 MHz and 6 dBi, respectively. The IoT devices (i.e., AWPDs
and HWPDs) have the antenna gains of 6 dBi [28]. Unless
otherwise specified, the default backscatter rate of backscatter
devices is set at 10 kpbs. In our setup, both the AWPDs
and HWPDs have the energy harvesting and data transmission
efficiency coefficients of ϕ = 0.6 and φ = 0.5, respectively.
A. Inefficiency of the Proposed Approach
Due to the selfish behavior of players, we evaluate the
inefficiency of the proposed approach by comparing with
the baseline scenarios, i.e., non-negotiated energy trading and
social welfare scenarios in this section. It is worth noting
that, in the non-negotiated energy trading, we choose a fixed
energy price at half of the maximum value. In Fig. 2, the
utility functions of the ISP for the proposed approach and
baseline scenarios are plotted versus the distance between the
PB and the IoT devices. It can be observed that the social
welfare scenario outperforms the proposed approach and the
non-negotiated energy trading scenario. This is due to the
cooperation between the ISP and ESP in the social welfare
scenario. In addition, the profit of the non-negotiated energy
trading scenario is also higher than the proposed approach.
The reason is that the ISP in the non-negotiated energy trading
scenario can find an optimal transmission power of the PB to
maximize its revenue with the fixed energy price, whereas the
ESP decides this figure in the proposed approach.
Fig. 3 shows the PoA ratio of the proposed approach using
the PA and JA schemes. In both cases, the PoA ratios are
small when the IoT devices are located near the PB. This is
due to that Moreover, the PoA ratios are equal to zero when
the distance between the PB and IoT devices is greater than
12 meters, and 18 meters in the cases of using the PA and
JA schemes, respectively. It is because when the ISP and ESP
are far away, the achievable profit of the ISP is lower than
the energy cost. Thus, there is no success negotiation between
these providers as shown in Fig. 2.
10
2 5 10 15 20
Distance between the PB and IoT device (m)
0
2
4
6
8
Ut
ilit
y 
of
 th
e 
Le
ad
er
104
Proposed method - PA scheme
Proposed method - JA scheme
Without negotiation - PA scheme
Without negotiation - JA scheme
Social Welfare - PA scheme
Social Welfare - JA scheme
Fig. 2: Leader’s payoff comparison with baseline
scenarios.
2 5 10 15 20
Distance between the PB and IoT devices (m).
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Pr
ic
e 
of
 A
na
rc
hy
PA scheme
JA scheme
Fig. 3: Price of Anarchy.
B. Revenue Performance of the ISP and ESP
For performance comparison, we consider three conven-
tional methods, i.e., the BBCM, HTTCM, and TDMA mech-
anism. It is worth noting that, in the TDMA mechanism, all
IoT devices are allocated with identical time resources. In this
case, the total backscatter time of the IoT devices accounts
for a half length of the normalized time frame as illustrated in
Fig. 1(b). Thus, the operation time of the PB β is fixed and
equal to the total backscatter time of the IoT devices.
1) Identical number of devices for each IoT devices set: We
first evaluate the performance of the proposed approach under
the setting that the number of devices in each IoT device type
are equal, (i.e., 10 devices for each IoT device type). Fig. 4
shows the variation of the leader’s payoff (i.e., the ISP) as
the benefit per bit transmitted (pr) increases in the range of
0.1 to 1. The common observation is that the utilities of the
ISP obtained by all methods increase as the benefit per bit
transmitted increases. That is a obvious result because with
more benefit gained by selling per one data bit, the ISP can
purchase energy either in longer time or higher transmission
power, or both, thus the profit of the ISP also increases.
In particular, we first observe that the proposed approach,
BBCM and HTTCM solved by scheme 2 always perform
better than themselves solved by scheme 1. The reason is due
to that the scheme 2 can optimize the profit of the IoT service
with respect to both offered price (pl) and the active time of
the PB (β), thus it can chooses a better local optimal point
than the scheme 1. Next, we also observe that the proposed
method solved by scheme 2 achieves the highest profit in
the considered range of pr. In contrast, the proposed method
solved by scheme 1 obtains a lower achieved profit than the
TDMA mechanism when the benefit per bit transmitted is
smaller than 1. Note that the scheme 1 prefers to offer a
high price to buy energy rather than a long period purchasing
energy, thus the optimal of this period in the scheme 1 is
smaller than in the TDMA mechanism. On the other hand, the
offered price has more weight than the energy purchasing time
in the energy cost. For this reason, the scheme 1 might perform
not as good as the TDMA mechanism when the benefit per
bit transmitted is under 1. Furthermore, the BBCM solved by
both schemes performs much worse than other methods, in
which the one solved by the scheme 2 is slightly better than
the one solved by the scheme 1.
In Fig. 5, we plot the profit of the leader versus the distance
between the PB and the IoT devices. At the distance of 2
meters, the profit of the ISP obtained by the BBCM using
both proposed schemes are much greater than those of other
approaches because transmission power of the PB is the major
impact on the performance of this approach. However, its
performance drastically decreases when the distance increases.
By contrast, the profits of the ISP obtained by the proposed ap-
proach and HTTCM slightly reduce as the distance is smaller
than 10 meters. There is no more profit for the proposed
approach and HTTCM using scheme 1 when the distance is
greater than or equal to 14 and 16 meters, respectively. Whilst,
the profits of these approaches solved by scheme 2 are only
equal to zero at the distance of 20 meters.
Next, we investigate the profit of the follower (i.e., the
ESP) in Fig. 6. First, we demonstrate this profit as a quadratic
function with respect to the transmission power of the PB as
shown in (14). Fig. 6(a) shows the offered prices correspond-
ing to the optimal points of the profit curve in both proposed
schemes. Furthermore, as shown in the figure, scheme 1
prefers the offered price than the time purchasing energy, while
the scheme 2 balances both factors. Thus, the benefit of the
ESP by selling energy in the scheme 1 is much greater than
the scheme 2. After applying the optimal transmission power
of the PB as in (16), the profit of the ESP depends on the
requested price and time purchasing energy (i.e., the operation
time of the PB) announced by the IoT service as shown in
Fig. 6(b). It can be seen that this profit increases linearly with
the time purchasing energy and non-linearly with the offered
energy price, respectively.
Fig. 7 shows the complexity of the proposed method solved
by both schemes. Because both schemes take only few itera-
tions to converge, thus in order to evaluate the computational
11
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efficiency of the proposed schemes more precisely, we measure
the runtime of these schemes in 1000 times with different
number of IoT devices (i.e., N = 5, N = 10, N = 15, in
which number of devices for each type is equal). In general,
we observe that the runtime of both schemes increases when
the number of IoT devices increase, and the maximum runtime
to solve the proposed method with 45 devices is just over 5
seconds in average by the scheme 1. In the case of small
number of IoT devices (i.e., N = 5), the computational
efficiency of the scheme 1 is better than the scheme 2. It is the
result of that the scheme 2 have to run two iterative algorithms
(i.e., both inner and outer iterative loops) compared to only
one iterative algorithm implemented in the scheme 1. Time
scheduling of the scheme 1 runs slower than the scheme 2
in all three cases because their feasible regions are different.
Therefore, when the number of IoT devices increases (i.e.,
N = 10, N = 15), the scheme 2 runs faster than the scheme
1. That is due to that time scheduling accounts for the majority
of the runtime of both schemes.
2) Different number of devices for each IoT devices’ set:
We now investigate the profit of the ISP by altering the number
of devices for one type from 3 to 30, while keeping these
figures for other types fixed at 10. Fig. 8(a) shows a profit
comparison of the ISP among approaches when varing the
12
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Fig. 8: Leader’s payoff under different numbers of (a) HWPDs, (b) AWPDs, and (c) PWPDs.
number of AWPDs. In general observation, as the number of
AWPDs is smaller than 24, the profit of the proposed method
solved by scheme 2 increases and is highest compared with
the others. However, when this number increases (i.e., larger
than or equal to 24), the profits of the proposed method solved
by both schemes are equal. There is no more profit added to
the proposed method due to the power constraint violation
of AWPDs. The profit of the TDMA mechanism is greater
than the figure of the proposed method solved by scheme 1
as the number of AWPDs is smaller than 15. The reason is
that as the number of AWPDs increases, the harvesting time
reduces, thus the throughput obtained by active transmission
declines. The profits of the HTTCM solved by both schemes
shows the same trend but are smaller than the proposed
method. These figures are also smaller than that of the TDMA
mechanism. The similar trends in the profits of the proposed
approach, HTTCM, and BBCM are demonstrated in Fig. 8(b).
The reason is that HWPDs can performs both functions, i.e.,
backscattering or active transmission. By contrast, the profit
of the TDMA is greater than all other approaches before it
remains unchanged as the number of devices is greater than or
equal to 9. In addition, as illustrated in Fig. 8(c), the increase
in the number of PWPDs causes no impact on the profit of
the proposed scheme due to the low level of backscatter rate.
By contrast, due to sharing the time resources for PWPDs, the
profit of the TDMA mechanism reduces linearly.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the Stackelberg game to maxi-
mize the profits of both service providers in heterogeneous IoT
wireless-powered communication networks. The Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SE) presented the proper price for the energy
service, emitting time of the PB, and optimal scheduling
times for the communication service has been obtained via
the closed-form and the PA/JA schemes that exploits the
BCD technique. Both the theoretical and numerical analyses
have shown the convergence and computing efficiency of the
iterative algorithm. Simulation results have shown that the
proposed scheme always outperforms other baseline methods
in terms of achieved profit of the ISP. It has also reveal that
the JA scheme defeats the PA scheme in all cases.
APPENDIX A
THE PROOF OF LEMMA 3
First, we consider the function G˜(ψ) in (31) contributed
by four terms Gp(θ) =
∑P
p=1 gp(θp), Ga(ν) =
∑A
a=1 ga(νa),
and Gh(τ ,µ) =
∑H
h=1 gh(τh, µh) and a constant C˜ where
gp(θp) = c˜p,1θp,
ga(νa) =prΩDνalog2
(
1+
c˜a,2
νa
)
,
gh(τh, µh) = c˜h,3τh+prΩDµhlog2
[
1+
c˜4,h−c˜h,5τh
µh
]
.
(40)
It is worth noting that the first term Gp(θ) are linear functions
of θp,∀p ∈ {1, . . . , P}. The second term Ga(ν) and third term
Gh(τ ,µ) are concave functions w.r.t. νa,∀a ∈ {1, . . . , A} and
(τh, µh),∀h ∈ {1, . . . ,H}, respectively, which are straightfor-
ward to prove by considering their Hassian matrices. More-
over, C˜ is a constant with the fixed {p(n)l , β(n)}. Finally, we
can conclude that the function G˜ is a concave function w.r.t.
ψ
∆
= (θ,ν, τ ,µ) and efficiently solved by the interior-point
method [29].
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At n-th iteration, from Lemma 1, 2, 3, we have:
UL
(
p
(n)
l , β
(n−1),ψ(n−1)
)
≥UL
(
p
(n−1)
l , β
(n−1),ψ(n−1)
)
,
UL
(
p
(n)
l , β
(n),ψ(n−1)
)
≥UL
(
p
(n)
l , β
(n−1),ψ(n−1)
)
,
UL
(
p
(n)
l , β
(n),ψ(n)
)
≥ UL
(
p
(n)
l , β
(n),ψ(n−1)
)
.
(41)
Due to the transitive property, we can obtain
UL
(
p
(n)
l , β
(n),ψ(n)
)
≥UL
(
p
(n−1)
l , β
(n−1),ψ(n−1)
)
. It is worth noting
that a feasible region determined by the constraints (18a)-(18f)
is a compact set and always contains the output χ(n), and thus
the Algorithm 1 will converge to the optimal solution χ∗.
In addition, the line search and interior-point methods always
find the optimal solutions of the problems (25), (27), (30) in
polynomial time [30]. Then the theorem is proved.
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We first prove the convergence of Algorithm 2. For k > 1,
we have:
Gˆ
(
V (k)
)
∆
=Gccav
(
V (k)
)
+Gcvex
(
V (k)
)
≥Gccav
(
V (k)
)
+Gcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
+
(
V (k)−V (k−1)
)T
∇Gcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
≥Gccav
(
V (k−1)
)
+
(
V (k−1)
)T
∇Gcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
+Gcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
−
(
V (k−1)
)T
∇Gcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
=Gccav
(
V (k−1)
)
+Gcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
∆
=Gˆ
(
V (k−1)
)
,
(42)
where the first inequality in (42) is derived from the first order
Taylor approximation of a convex function [29]:
Gcvex
(
V (k)
)
≥Gcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
+
(
V (k)−V (k−1)
)T
∇Gcvex
(
V (k−1)
)
.
(43)
The second inequality is obtained from (39). We define SV is
the set of V satisfying the constraints (34a)-(34e). Since the
SV is a compact set and V (k) is always within the feasible set
SV , the CCCP algorithm will converge to V (∗), i.e., V (k) =
V (k−1) = V ∗. Thus the Algorithm 2 is convergence.
Next, we prove that V ∗ is a local optimum of the opti-
mization problem (39). We define a constraint set C (V ) ∆=
{C1 (V ) , C2 (V ) , . . . , CL}, where L is the total number of
constraints in the problem (39). Since SV is a compact set and
Gˆ (V ) is concave function of V , we have the KKT condition
for the optimization problem (39) as follows:{ ∇Gccav(V (k))+∇Gcvex(V (k−1))+Y T∇C (V (k))=0
Y = [y1, y2, . . . , yL] , yi ≥ 0, yiCi
(
V (k)
)
= 0,∀i (44)
where Y is the optimal Lagrangian variable set for V (k). When
V (k) = V (k−1) = V ∗, the above equation set can be rewritten
as follows:{ ∇Gccav (V ∗) +∇Gcvex (V ∗) + ZT∇C (V ∗) = 0
Z = [z1, z2, . . . , zL] , zi ≥ 0, ziCi (V ∗) = 0,∀i (45)
where Z is the optimal Lagrangian variable set for V ∗. That
means V ∗ is a local optimum for the problem (39) that satisfies
the KKT condition.
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